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Do legislators learn to use new communication technologies from each other? Using data
from the ocial homepages of members of the U.S. House of Representatives, we test whether
web-based communication technology diuses through congressional state delegations. We
use a natural experimental design that exploits ignorable state boundaries to distinguish
between causal diusion processes and spatial heterogeneity. Using nonlinear conditional
autoregressive models for the statistical test, we nd that web communication technology
practices are weakly driven by communication within state delegations, and with the eect
slightly more pronounced among Democrats than among Republicans.1 Introduction
The practice of representation is central to any legislator's responsibilities, both normatively
(Pitkin, 1967) and empirically (Fenno, 1978). The relatively recent development of Internet-
based communication technologies has the potential to transform the way legislators engage
in these practices (Druckman, Hennessy, Kifer, and Parkin, 2009; Druckman, Kifer, and
Parkin, 2007). As with technological innovation in any occupational eld, legislators must
learn how to adopt and implement these new communication technologies. In this paper,
we examine whether this learning occurs among members of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, focusing on the extent of diusion of web-based communication technologies among
representatives' ocial homepages. It is well known within the literature on Congress that
members often discuss legislative issues and procedures with other members from their state
delegation (Truman, 1956). We therefore expect that a member will be more (less) likely to
adopt new website communication practices if other members of her state delegation have
(have not) adopted the practices.
A vast array of studies in other organizational settings highlights the critical role that
informal networks play in the adoption of innovations (Rogers, 1976). Further, there is a
substantial literature on the important role networks play within the Washington system
more generally (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 1998, 2003, 2004; Heinz, Laumann, Nelson,
and Salisbury, 1993; Laumann and Knoke, 1984) as well as some research on interconnec-
tions among state legislators. There has been little research on the informal mechanisms of
the diusion of technical innovations in the congressional system, however { a system that
includes not just 435 members of the House of Representatives and 100 Senators, but many
thousands of sta members as well. More generally, there is very little research on the infor-
mal network of the members of the congressional system and the impact of that network on
the decisions of Congressional oces (for exceptions, see Baughman, 2006; Fowler, 2006).
We hypothesize that attention to website communication technology will diuse through
informal communication networks dened by membership in state delegations, that is, amongEsterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 2
members that happen to share a geographic physical proximity. A major inferential issue
in testing the eects of spatial diusion, or diusion among physically proximate units, is
to distinguish a diusion process from a process driven simply by unmeasured confounding
variables that are spatially correlated with the communication network (see Lazer, 2001). As
we describe below, we are able to take advantage of a quasi-experiment to identify the causal
eect of diusion, exploiting the ignorable1 state boundaries that dene the state delegation
communication network. Using data on the technology adoptions of neighboring congres-
sional districts, some of which are across state lines, we are able to control for unobserved
spatially-distributed heterogeneity, and so we can identify the causal eect of membership
in a state delegation on technology adoption. Our results suggest that the state delegation
informal networks play a perceptible, but not major, role in the diusion of website commu-
nication technologies among congressional oces, and that this diusion is somewhat greater
among Democrats than among Republicans.
This paper is divided into four sections. The rst section reviews the literature on the
role social networks play in diusion of innovations, focusing on what we know about the
informal networks within legislatures. The second section summarizes the research design
and data we will be examining, and the third presents our statistical analyses. The nal
sections discuss our results and implications for future directions in this vein of research.
2 State Delegations and the Diusion of Website Com-
munication Technology
The role of social networks is probably the single most studied driver of the diusion of
innovations (Coleman, Katz, and et al, 1957; Hagerstrand, 1967; Ryan and Gross, 1943).
Learning through observing others' experiences lowers the ambiguity and perceived risk as-
sociated with an innovation (Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991; Haunschild and Milner, 1997;
Valente, 1995). Further, the behaviors of others creates a normative environment. A be-
1Ignorability in this context requires that the distribution of unobserved variables are not aected by
where the state boundary line is drawn. We test for this ignorability below.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 3
havior is legitimate because others who are similarly situated are doing it, inducing mimetic
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
Social network research has found that strong or \high bandwidth" relationships { those
based on personal familiarity, trust, and high frequency { are especially important for the
exchange of complex, tacit, or condential knowledge (Hansen, 1999). A number of stud-
ies in the social networks literature show, for example, that physical co-location increases
job related communication in work groups, because proximity tends to drive and facilitate
regularized communication (den Bulte and Moenaert, 1998). Co-location or spatial prox-
imity itself will not lead to an increased communication- they are just prerequisites for
higher exposure, more frequent informal occasions where people meet in the hallways or
other social areas within oce buildings. These meetings in turn increase the probability
of informal communication regarding successful technology practices (Allen, 1978; Festinger,
1950; Kraut, Egido, and et al, 1990; Monge, Rothman, and et al, 1985; Rice and Aydin,
1991; Zahn, 1991). Walker's (1969) classic study of the diusion of innovations among the
American states shows that diusion tends to occur more regularly among adjacent states,
which he took to proxy for more regular communication among state-level policy activists
(see also Mintrom, 1997).
In the present case, the adoption of Web-based communication technologies is largely
public; all Member web sites are public. The logic and experience underlying particular
decisions is private, however, and this private information is unevenly distributed. The
role of informal advice networks (who asks whom for advice regarding their web sites) and
attention networks (who pays attention to whom) are likely fairly powerful with respect to
Members of Congress. Thus, for example, it might require repeated interactions and high
levels of familiarity between two chiefs of sta from Members' oces to eectively transfer the
knowledge about implementation challenges with respect to particular web-based practices.
The tendency of members from the same state to meet and discuss policy and process
legislative issues is well known in the literature on Congress (Truman, 1956). At the stateEsterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 4
level, Caldeira and Patterson (1987) nd similar patterns of friendship among Iowa state leg-
islators with districts closer together. Arnold, Dean, and Al (2000) purport2 to demonstrate
that friendship ties among Ohio state legislators causes members to more often vote on the
same side of issues, holding other causes of members' vote similarity constant. As we men-
tion above, there has been very little research on the potential inuence of social networks
within the US Congress because of the practical challenges in collecting social network data
from congressional oces.3 In this paper, we test whether diusion of website technologies
occurs through state delegations.
3 Distinguishing Spatial Heterogeneity from Diusion
using a Natural Experiment
The major inferential issue in testing hypotheses about diusion among geographically-
proximate units involves distinguishing a diusion process from mere spatial heterogeneity,
where omitted confounding variables exist that are correlated with spatial network patterns
(Congdon 2003, 274; Lazer 2001). If the websites of the members of a state delegation are
all likely to have a given characteristic, and websites in another state are unlikely to, we
wish to be able to test whether this correlation is due to a causal diusion process, or due
to a spurious dependence where many members of a state delegation may happen to share
an unobserved causal variable. If the latter is true, we would only observe heterogeneity
between state delegations, and this is only observationally equivalent to a diusion process.
To address this, we make use of the ignorable state boundaries that dene state delegations
in a quasi-experimental design intended to distinguish heterogeneity from causal diusion.
Using conditional autoregressive (CAR) models (Congdon, 2003, 278-282), we are able to
control for spatial heterogeneity by exploiting data from other members whose congressional
2Unfortunately their results are questionable because their OLS analysis is vulnerable to the criticisms
of spuriousness that we describe below. In short, the non-random assignment of nodes to network locations
raises inferential problems that are very common in studies of social network analysis.
3Notable exceptions include Baughman (2006), who shows how informal sta communication among mem-
bers who have overlapping committee assignments reduces the transaction costs for writing and negotiating
legislation, and Fowler (2006), who examines co-sponsorship networks.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 5
districts are adjacent to each other. If spatially confounding variables exist, they would
most likely be evident in these localized networks, since adjacent congressional districts share
more similarities than districts in opposite ends of the state. For example, the California
45th district (including the desert cities of Palm Springs and Indio) shares more similarities
with the Arizona 7th district (parts of Yuma, Maricopa and Pima desert counties) than
with the California 6th district (wine country, Marin and Sonoma counties). Assuming
relevant spatially distributed variables are not conditioned by state boundaries, evidence is
lent in support of spatial diusion as opposed to mere heterogeneity if, controlling for spatial
heterogeneity among adjacent districts, members' web communication practices are causally
dependent within networks dened by state delegation.
One can see the logic of this natural experimental design in gure 1. This gure takes
congressional district D = f6g as the \subject" district (the estimator of course repeats the
analysis for all 438 districts in the dataset). D is in state X, and is directly adjacent to
seven other districts: O = f3;4;5;7g also in state X, and C = f11;13;14g that are in states
Y and Z; A = fO [ Cg is the full set of adjacent districts. The state delegation for state
X is composed of districts S = f1;2;:::;9g, and in this delegation, only T = f1;2;89g are
not adjacent to D. The experimental design assumes that the adjacent districts A have the
most similar values on unobserved variables to D. The set C  A serves as a true control
group, analogous to a \pretreatment" condition, since these districts are not in S. The set
T = S=O is the exposure to the treatment, analogous to a \post treatment" condition. The
set O = fA \ Sg are only partial controls since in this region the treatment condition (being
in the set S) and the control condition (being in set A) overlap.
The statistical estimator uses the outcome data from the districts in A to create an
experimental \pretreatment" baseline, and holding this baseline constant, estimates the
post treatment eect of being in set S. So for example, consider the eect of being in
delegation S on whether or not a member chooses to have a blog on her ocial webpage.
The model dynamically estimates 1) p(A) equal to the average propensity of the districtsEsterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 6
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Figure 1: The Logic of the Natural Experiment
in A to have a blog on their web pages, 2) p(S) equal to the average propensity of the
districts in S to have a blog on their web pages, and 3) holding p(A) constant, the model
estimates the eect of p(S) on the propensity for D to have a blog on her website.4 One
can think of this design as similar to a random eect model that identies a pretreatment
condition, where the adjacent districts in C serve as \repeated observations" for district D
in the pretreatment control condition, and the districts in T represent the exposure in the
4As we describe below, p(A) and p(S) are the posterior distribution of these propensities, and so the
model accounts for the full distributions of each, not simply their point estimates.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 7
post treatment condition. The districts in S and in A necessarily have some overlap (their
union is never null); the greater the overlap the fewer districts in T, and hence the more
conservative is the treatment eect estimator. Thus, the model gets the most purchase on
the treatment eect from states that lie on a state border. (294 out of 438 districts lie on a
border, or about 67 percent of districts).
The persuasiveness of this quasi-experimental approach depends critically on the ignor-
ability of state boundaries for unobserved spatially distributed confounding variables. This
assumes there is nothing about the location of the state border that aects citizens' location
patterns or the qualities of members that are in districts that are geographically proximate,
but on either side of the state line. For example, this assumption holds that residents in the
Louisville area would equally likely choose to live in New Albany, Indiana, across the Ohio
River, as they would a Kentucky-side suburb, and members that serve in each type of suburb
share similar qualities. One would also expect that New Albany will dier demographically
and politically from South Bend or Kokomo.
We can test for the ignorability of state boundaries using aggregate district level census
data. If the state borders are ignorable, then aggregate census data should be balanced
between districts that are on either side of the state border, among those that are adjacent
to a district that lies on a border. That is, census data should be balanced between the
districts in O and C when stratied for each border congressional district. At the same
time, one would not expect census data to be balanced between districts in the control set
C and those in the treatment set T. We test balance only among the 242 districts that lie
adjacent to a border and that are in a state large enough to have districts that are within
the state but not adjacent (55 percent of districts in the sample meet these conditions). For
covariates we use current census data on district median income; the percent of the district
residents that are college educated; in the service employment sector; the blue collar sector;
under 18; Hispanic; Asian; Black; residentially rural; and the percent voting for Kerry in
the 2004 general election. Using the omnibus balance test statistic of Hansen and BowersEsterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 8
(Hansen and Bowers, 2008), we cannot reject the hypothesis of balance between O and
C (p = 0:881), but we can reject the hypothesis of balance between C and T (p = 0:056).
While this exogeneity is true for these observed variables, the assumption still may be
violated in several ways. For example, it is possible that state level education, tax or other
social policies can aect citizens' location decisions and these can aect relevant variables
not measured in the census. Or it is possible that the recruitment patterns of members dier
across states, for example if the parties have dierent organizational structures across states.
Note that a failure to rule out spatial heterogeneity does not disprove the diusion hy-
pothesis; if correlations are evident within both the district-adjacencies network and the
state delegation network, this simply leaves the two processes, heterogeneity and diusion,
as observationally equivalent. An observed correlation within the district adjacency network
but not within the state delegation network would lend evidence in favor of heterogeneity.
Finally, no observed correlations within either network would simply suggest that website
practices are independent within both networks (but not necessarily within conceivable,
unmeasured networks).
4 Data
Within the U.S. House of Representatives, congressional oces are 440 (including nonvot-
ing delegates) small, functionally identical, public organizations with a set of policy and
procedural outputs (Hedlund, 1984; Salisbury and Shepsle, 1981). This enables a large N
statistical study of innovation adoption. Below we discuss the innovations that we are study-
ing { website communication technologies { as well as control variables that we have shown
elsewhere (Esterling, Lazer, and Neblo, 2005) are important drivers of website quality, and
how we created the district adjacency and state delegation matrices.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 9
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Scale Mean SD
Blog 0-1 0:05 0:22
Podcast 0-1 0:04 0:20
Text Only 0-1 0:07 0:25
Audio 0-1 0:16 0:37
Video 0-1 0:36 0:48
RSS Feed 0-1 0:10 0:29
Look & Feel 1-5 3:26 1:01
Navigation 1-5 3:50 0:88
Readability 1-5 3:20 0:83
Organization 1-5 3:43 0:82
Timeliness 1-5 3:14 0:91
N = 438
4.1 Outcome variables
The dependent variables we use for this analysis are drawn from the 2006 Congressional
Management Foundation (CMF) coding of the ocial web site for each member of Congress.5
The coding for these variables, and the instructions given to the coders, are listed in appendix
table 2. The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are listed in table 1.
The rst six items measure the presence or absence of a number of technological features
of websites that enhance communication. These are the presence of a Blog, Podcasting
capability, the ability to read the page in Text only, the presence of Audio and Video, and
support for RSS feed. Note that none of these items are especially prevalent on congressional
websites in 2006. For example, only ve percent of members had a blog, and only 10 percent
had support for RSS feed. The nal ve items measure general technical properties of the
website design, and are all rated on a one to ve scale. These include the Look & feel of
5In the summer of 2006, CMF coded each ocial website based on nearly 100 operational criteria. These
items tap into what makes for a good House website in the normative sense - i.e., whether the website
both communicates information constituents want to see on websites, and information the member wants
constituents to know. The criteria were identied using a number of sources: asking focus groups of citizens
to spend time on a sample of sites, interviews and surveys with oce sta and citizens, as well as Web
industry research. For more detail on the coding dimensions, intercoder reliability, and other technical issues,
see the 2006 \gold mouse" award report, http://www.cmfweb.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=198&Itemid=60.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 10
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the website, its Navigability, its Readability, the website's Organization, and the Timeliness
of the information content on the website. Finally, we use all 11 of these outcome variables
to construct a single factor scale for the latent technological quality of the website using an
ordered item response model. These items all load strongly on a single underlying factor
(factor scores not reported).
4.2 Network Adjacency Data
We expect that the diusion of the quality of members' websites will depend to some extent
on informal social communication within the Congress. Following the discussion above, in
this paper we measure informal networks by memberships in state delegations. To construct
this network variable, we simply constructed a matrix with rows representing members,
columns with labels that are identical to the rows, cells [i;j] equal to one if members in row i
and column j are in the same state, and cells equal to zero if members i and j are in dierent
states.6 Our quasi-experimental design also requires a matrix of district adjacencies. This
matrix is similar to the state delegation matrix, with the exception that the cells are equal
to one if two members' districts are adjacent, and zero otherwise.7
For the spatial statistical models we report below, it is possible for the precision of
estimated correlation parameters to be a function of the average density of the adjacency
matrix, where the average density is the total number of ones divided by the number of matrix
cells. The average density of the state delegation adjacency matrix is 0.042, while the average
density of the district adjacency matrix is 0.023. To test the robustness of our results below
to variation in network density, we constructed a supplemented district adjacency matrix
that equals one if two districts are either adjacent to each other or are within one district
6Note on how we handle zero rows.
7Generating the matrix of district adjacencies takes some doing. We downloaded the GIS shapele
of congressional districts for the 109th Congress from the USGS National Atlas website. Unfortunately,
this shape le does not represent districts, but instead represents smaller polygons that, when aggregated,
reconstruct a congressional district, and obviously adjacencies among these polygons are not of any use for
this analysis. Aggregating the data up to the district level turned out to be a very complex task, requiring
over a hundred lines of R code. The R script to do this is available from the authors on request.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 14
of each other (i.e., on a two step path). The average density of this supplemented district
adjacency matrix is 0.064. Thus the two district adjacency matrices create density bounds
below and above the state delegation density. We nd little dierence in the estimates for
district adjacency across these two distance measures, so below to simplify the discussion we
only present the results on the former, single-step adjacency matrix.
It is worth noting that the USGS data from which the district adjacencies are constructed
include non-voting delegates from D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, but for some
reason not the ones from Guam and American Samoa. Thus, our eective sample is 438
(435 regular members plus three non-voting delegates).
4.3 Control variables
We hold constant two variables that in previous work (Esterling et al., 2005) we found
to have an eect on the quality of legislative websites. In the model below we refer to
these as the xed eect variables. Members who have longer terms in oce tend to make
less eective use of website technology.8 To control for this, we include a measure the
equals one if the member is a Freshmen and zero otherwise (mean 0.096, standard deviation
0.295). In addition, the institutional context within Congress also can create advantages
and disadvantages for members to undertake new initiatives. We control for the member's
political party by including a variable that equals one if the member is a Republican (the
majority party in 2006) and zero otherwise (mean 0.533, standard deviation 0.499).
8Members gain greater electoral security with longer tenure in oce due to the well-known incumbent
advantages (Jacobson, 1987, 26). Members with longer tenures in oce have fewer incentives to seek out in-
novative ways to interact with constituents through their websites than those with shorter tenures. Members
with longer tenures also are more likely to have well-established ways of communicating with constituents
(Arnold, 2004) and thus are unlikely to place much eort in this new form of legislative communication.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 15
5 Estimation
We hypothesize that a member's eective use of website communication technologies depends
on the propensity of other members in her state delegation to use these technologies, and
these other members themselves are in the same estimation sample. Because of this stochastic
dependence among members' websites, using ordinary probit to examine the relationship
between a member's adoption practices and the average of the outcomes of the individuals
that person interacts with would result in an estimate of social inuence that would be
biased upwards. The statistical literature on geographically connected processes has devised
techniques to study spatial inter-dependencies in a way that appropriately accounts for these
reciprocal eects (Anselin, 1988; Cli and Ord, 1981; Doreian, 1980). For this paper we
estimate network dependence with a conditionally autoregressive (CAR) model (Congdon,
2003, chapter 7) using Bayesian MCMC sampling to simulate a posterior distribution of all
model parameters. The basic model is:
Oi  Categorical(pi;1:::5)
pi;1 = 1   qi;1
pi;2 = qi;1   qi;2
pi;3 = qi;2   qi;3
pi;4 = qi;3   qi;4
pi;5 = qi;4
logit(qi;1) = b1  x1;i + b2  x2;i + ai + si   k1
logit(qi;2) = b1  x1;i + b2  x2;i + ai + si   k2
logit(qi;3) = b1  x1;i + b2  x2;i + ai + si   k3
logit(qi;4) = b1  x1;i + b2  x2;i + ai + si   k4
ai  (ai;1)
ai = a 
PNai
k=1(Waik)=(Nai)
Waik 2 faj : j is adjacent to ig
Nai = #faj : j has an adjacent district to ig
si  (si;1)
si = s 
PNsi
k=1(Wsik)=(Nsi)
Wsik 2 fsj : j is in the same state delegation as ig
Nsi = #fsj : j is in the same state delegation as ig
9
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
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a  Uniform(0;0.99)
s  Uniform(0;0.99)
b1  (0.0;1.0E-5)
b2  (0.0;1.0E-5)
k1  ( 1;0.1)C( 5;k2)
k2  (-0.5;0.1)C(k1;k3)
k3  (0.5;0.1)C(k2;k4)
k4  (1;0.1)C(k3;5)
The set of equations contained within the outermost bracket give the model likelihood.
We estimate the model separately for each ordered indicator, Oi, measuring the presence
of each website quality or feature listed in table 1; each is modeled with an ordered logit
function. Note the dichotomous outcome variables are also ordered so we use the same
equation but estimate only one threshold. The conditional probability of each outcome is
taken to be a function of the two xed eect control variables, x, their estimated coecients,
b, a category-specic threshold kj, and the two random intercepts, ai and si. Here, ai is a
random eect that captures local-level heterogeneity, and si is a random eect that captures
dependence among members of a state delegation.
To see that ai and si are random intercepts capturing local- and state-level dependence,
respectively, note that these two variables are themselves a function of other members'
random intercepts. For each member, dene the district-level adjacency set of member i
as the set of members j with a one in the ith row of the district adjacency matrix. Dene
the state delegation of member i as the set of members j with a one in the ith row of the
state adjacency matrix. The random intercept ai is assumed to have a normally distributed
prior, with mean a function of the random intercepts of the member's district adjacency set
(this is known as a CAR prior). The random intercept si is assumed to have a normally
distributed prior, with mean a function of the random intercepts of the member's state
delegation. Inference for the social network eects are based on a and s, both scalars. a
is the eect of a change in the probability a member's website will have one of the features
or characteristics in table 1 is associated with the propensity of the websites of those that
are in the member's district adjacency set to also have the feature or characteristic.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 17
This propensity is based on a weighted average with weight equal to Ni, or the number of
elements in the member's district adjacency neighborhood set. Likewise, s is the eect of a
change in the propensity of a member's website to have a feature or characteristic associated
with the propensity of the websites of those that are in the member's state delegation to
have the feature or characteristic. Each  is a spatial correlation parameter that captures
the degree of spatial dependence at each geographic level (district and state). Because we
control for district level heterogeneity via ai, s captures the causal dependence among the
websites of members within a state delegation.9
To round out the analyzes, below we extend this model in two ways. First, we create
an overall summary measure of the quality of the communication technology on each mem-
ber's website using an ordered item response model, and embed this model into the main
model to construct a full structural equation model (SEM). This SEM allows us to test for
the dependence of the aggregate or latent quality of website technologies using all of the
indicators simultaneously. Second, we create an interaction between the member's political
party and the network dependence random eect to test whether diusion is more preva-
lent within either of the political parties. This requires breaking the conditional mean of
the state diusion random intercept distribution into two terms: Rs  Republicani  si and
Ds  (1   Republicani)  si.
For estimation, we use the MCMC Gibbs sampler in WinBUGS (Spiegelhalter, Thomas,
Best, and Gilks, 1996). We assume diuse priors for b to minimize the inuence of the prior
parameter distributions on the posteriors. We sample three chains and initialize each chain
with overdispersed starting values. We discarded the rst 5,000 iterations to allow burn-in,
and then sampled an additional 5001 draws for each chain, keeping one in every ten draws,
for a total sample of 1503 across the three chains. The chains show extremely good mixing
using the Brooks-Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992). Below we present
9The correlation parameters in principal can take values in the range [-1,1]. In the model, we constrain
each  to be positive, since a priori it is not plausible under either the diusion or the heterogeneity hypothesis
that members would systematically be dissimilar with their neighbors.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 18
the marginal posterior distributions of the model parameters.
6 Findings
One advantage of Bayesian estimation is that the results are reported in full marginal dis-
tributions, rather than as summaries of distributions in the form of point estimates and
standard errors. Thus, one can evaluate the signicance of parameter estimates by com-
paring their posterior distributions without relying on strict (frequentist) hypothesis tests.
In this paper, we present these posterior distributions graphically as empirical cumulative
densities and compare these densities to the priors as well as across parameters.
The results of the basic model for the 11 outcomes and the overall latent variable are
shown in gure 2. The results are shown as comparisons of empirical cumulative density
functions for the two spatial dependence parameters, a and s. See the appendix for spe-
cic guidance on interpreting comparisons between cumulative density functions. In each
gure, we graph the posterior distribution for the heterogeneity dependence parameter for
the district adjacency matrix, F(a) in blue, and the cumulative density for the parameter
capturing diusion within state delegations, F(s) in maroon. The cumulative distribution
for the uniform prior on [0,0.9] for each of these parameters is shown as a dashed grey line.
In this application, a rho with a cumulative density that is to the right of the dashed line
indicates that there is a positive dependence at that geographic level, and a one with a cu-
mulative density to the left of the dashed line indicates no dependence or a very low level of
dependence. We test for the dierence between distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) test.
First, each of the posterior distributions is statistically dierent from the priors (the
probability level for each KS test is less than 0.001). Note, however, that all of the cumulative
densities for a lie to the left of the prior, indicating that there is little to no dependence
at the district level. This means that there are few geographically distributed variables thatEsterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 19
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Figure 2: The Basic Results
This gure compares the posterior distributions for the estimated eects of state delegation
(s) and district adjacency (a). F(.) indicates the cumulative posterior distribution for
each  parameter. A cumulative distribution to the right indicates a higher mode for the
parameter. The dashed grey line is the cumulative prior distribution for each parameter.
The KS test in each frame is the test for the dierence between the two posteriors.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 20
are correlated with the adoption of new website technologies.
In contrast, many of the cumulative densities for s are signicantly to the right of both
the prior as well as to the posteriors for a. This indicates that for these items, there exists
dependence within state delegations. In particular, we observe dependence within state
delegations for podcast, text only, audio, navigation, readability, and timeliness. Notably,
we do not see a dependence for overall score, which suggests that the dependence is at the
feature level rather than at a deeper, latent quality level. That is, the fact other members in
a state have high quality (feature rich) sites does not drive a member of the state delegation
to have a feature rich site { rather, the presence of a particular feature would drive you to
have that specic feature (for the subset of features where we nd dependence).
To test whether diusion occurs dierently within the political parties, we re-ran the
same model including interactions to allow each rho parameter to dier for each party. We
report the results for this model in gure 3. There is very little that is dierent between the
two political parties with the exception for a few items where there appears to be slightly
more dependence for Democrats than for Republicans. These items are audio, look and feel,
organization, and the overall summary measure. Finally, consider the eect estimates for the
xed eect regression parameters, reported in table 3. The freshmen (elected in 2004) tend
to score higher on the general technical measures of look and feel, navigation, readability,
organization and timeliness.
More importantly, the xed eect results for party suggest that, while there are dierent
diusion patterns within the parties, the two parties overall have similar average amounts
of communication technology on their websites, with Republicans having a slightly higher
propensity for a few items (text only, audio, a high look and feel rating, and a timeliness
rating). This implies that while there exists more dependence among Democratic members
within state delegations, this dependence does not necessarily improve the quality of websites.
Indeed, the correlation implies that, especially among Democrats, a member with a low
quality website will drive down the quality of the websites of others in the delegation.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 21
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Figure 3: The Results Estimated Separately for Each Party
This gure compares the degree of diusion within state delegations separately for each
political party. Ds is the posterior distribution for the state delegation diusion parameter
for Democrats, and Rs is the same for Republicans. A cumulative distribution to the right
indicates a higher mode for that party. KS tests compare the two posteriors in each graph.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 22
Table 3: Model Fixed Eects Results
Freshman Party (R=1)
 SE()  SE()
Blog 0:22 (0:57) 0:44 (0:37)
Podcast 0:49 (0:57)  0:58 (0:39)
Text Only  1:3 (0:34) 1:0 (0:37)
Audio  0:21 (0:45) 0:74 (0:28)
Video 0:38 (0:36)  0:09 (0:22)
RSS Feed  0:01 (0:51)  0:32 (0:24)
Look & Feel 0:99 (0:40) 0:48 (0:24)
Navigation 0:88 (0:40) 0:18 (0:24)
Readability 1:0 (0:41) 0:21 (0:23)
Organization 0:86 (0:42) 0:29 (0:24)
Timeliness 1:2 (0:41) 0:46 (0:23)
N = 438, p < :05
7 Triangulating the Results using Survey Data and In-
terviews
We triangulate the ndings of the spatial diusion models using the results of a winter,
2007, survey of the Congressional sta in charge of the members' ocial websites. Out
of 440 oces surveyed, we received 100 responses (23 percent). We asked respondents,
\Among other Members of Congress' websites, are there ones that stand out to you as
especially good? If yes, which do you think are particularly good?" Only 52 oces were
named (some oces were mentioned multiple times. Of those 52, 86 percent were within
the same party, and (when combined with 11 responses indicating the state delegation),
60 percent were within the same state delegation.10 We treated these as egocentric data,
assuming independence across respondents.11 We label the nominating oce the \ego" and
the potentially nominated website the \target." In this model, each ego could possibly name
10We also asked about who the Member was friends with, with similar results: of 90 \friends" named, 87
percent were same party, and 44 percent were same state.
11Standard methods to analyze whole network data, such as MRQAP and p*, are not appropriate because
of the low response rate. However, the independence assumption is still problematic-e.g., if A names B, this
may mean C is more likely to name B as well. We will address this estimation issue in future editions of this
paper.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 23
Table 4: Logistic (rare event) results for naming other oces
Variable Coef. Std. Err.
Same Party 1:57 :54
Same State 1:52 :41
Adjacent Districts :33 :66
Target is a Leader 1:04 :34
The Term for Target  :02 :04
Target is a Democrat  :61 :56
Ego is a Democrat :77 :55
Constant  8:50 :63
N = 52767; p < 0:05:
Note: The model also controls for the CMF ratings of the quality
of both ego's website and the potential target's website (results not
reported).
any of the potential targets, and given the sparseness of the data, we specied a rare events
logit model (King and Zeng, 2001). For covariates, we use Same party indicating both ego
and potential target are in the same party; Same state indicating both are in the same state
delegation; Adjacent district indicating the districts are geographically adjacent; whether the
potential target is a Party leader; the potential target's Term or length of service; whether
the potential Target is a Democrat; and whether the Ego is a Democrat.12
The logistic regression conrms that state delegation was a powerful predictor that one
oce would name another (p < :001), while district adjacency (when controlling for same
state delegation) was not signicant. Also important were whether both oces were from
the same party, whether the named oces was from party leadership leadership.
7.1 Interview Qualitative Data
We also conducted structured interviews on information sharing processes among oces in
the summer of 2006 involving 99 oces. These interviews were transcribed and coded in
12We also include a battery of controls for the quality rating of each website (for both ego and target)
along a variety of dimensions, such as the quality of the issue content, constituency service, technology, etc.
(results not reported).Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 24
NVivo. The interview data also support the proposition that there was a powerful emulation
process within state delegations. As one sta person stated, \I was not in the business of
trying to reinvent the wheel." There are two pathways by which oces may aect each other:
interpersonal communication and passive mimicry. That is, some sta merely look at other
websites, while others talk to each other about the features of the websites. The following
interviewee illustrates diusion both through mimicry and interpersonal communication:
We looked at every single website .... We probably had [a list of] the top 30
sites. I individually contacted every single one of those oces, and found out,
who do you use for your website, who does the upkeep of it, who designed it, got
all of the specics of it ...
While the interview data make clear that both processes of diusion existed, it is clear
that mimicry dominated interpersonal communication, where the following statement is
representative:
I didn't talk to other sta members. I denitely looked at other Members' sites
very carefully and tried to see what, what they were doing that might work for
us.
Strikingly, only one oce out of ninety nine reported talking extensively to other oces
about internal processes (e.g., website design; how to get content on the website, etc.). In-
terpersonal communication was generally limited to identifying vendors, where the following
two responses are typical:
We've looked at basically every other member site there is .... [W]e picked out
the ones we liked the best, and I contacted their sta, and we found out who
their ...vendor was.
I mean, I just talked to a bunch of my friends that are press secretaries basically.
I just called them and said hey, who do you guys use, or, you know, is there
anything you'd recommend? I really like your site, who did you use? Yeah, you
know, basically word of mouth. [Name] did the same, our chief of sta. And he
talked to some other chiefs of sta, in terms of cost and benets, and customer
service.
These last two quotes illustrate two dierent strategies for identifying who to talk to. The
rst relied on an extensive search of what was observable to guide personal contact. TheEsterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 25
 
Figure 4: Emulation Process in Congress
second indicates a reliance on friends, that is, a particular type of interpersonal network,
friendship, guided interpersonal information seeking. Our interview data suggests that inter-
personal information seeking was signicant (23 percent indicated talking to other oces),
but the dominant mode of learning from what other oces were doing was mimicry { just
looking at other websites. Figure 4 summarizes the distribution of social learning strategies
we observed among the people we interviewed (based on a coding of their responses to our
structured interviews).
8 Discussion and Conclusion
The above analyses provide insight into the pathways of innovation within Congress, where
the dierent data sources provide a degree of triangulation as to what the underlying pro-
cesses are. We nd a signicant possibility of diusion within state delegations. The results
of the analysis of the spatial dependence are highly suggestive, but we admit the possibilityEsterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 26
of confounding variables that are conditioned on state boundaries. However, the two other
data sources further bolster the relative plausibility that diusion is driving this dependence.
Specically, we conducted a social network survey of the sta in charge of their Member's
website, and we found that being in the same state delegation was a powerful predictor of
a tie between two oces, while adjacency was not. The interview data further conrms the
interdependence of website features, highlighting a primary role for mimicry (looking at and
copying what other oces have done), and a secondary role for interpersonal communica-
tion. The pattern of spatial dependence also reinforces this conclusion, where the feature of a
website that is most quickly evaluated by a harried communication director-its timeliness-is
also the feature that shows the strongest sign of diusion.
This is our rst cut at these data. There are several obvious lines we intend to pursue.
First, we wish to model diusion across dierent possible informal communication networks,
including cosponsorship networks (Fowler, 2006), committee overlap networks (Baughman,
2006), and hallway proximity networks, which would measure the physical distance between
members' oces. The latter has the interesting feature that the selection of members to
oces is likely exogenous to other informal networks, ruling out the inferential problems
stemming from homophily, or the problem that members connected in informal networks
also share attributes (or the non-geographic version of spatial heterogeneity that we discuss
above). Second, the CMF dataset has a very rich set of indicators of a variety of attributes
of members websites, which allows test across substantive categories of variables, as well as
tests of the diusion of latent properties of websites that could be captured in spatial latent
variable autoregressive models.
Third, we are rening the alignment between the survey and the analysis of spatial
dependence-for example, the survey suggests that there should be greater dependence among
individuals from the same party member, which we should be able to test directly. Finally,
there are a variety of priors in addition to CAR one can assume to model the diusion
process, and we hope to test the robustness of our results across these dierent priors.Esterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 27
A Appendix: Interpreting Comparisons between Em-
pirical Cumulative Density Functions
Figures 2 and 3 report the results of the statistical models in terms of comparisons of the
posterior distributions of the spatial dependence parameters. Here we walk the reader though
how to read such a graph, using the results for Podcast as the example. Figure 5 shows the
Podcast gure enlarged, and with some more detail given. In this gure, each curve shows the
empirical cumulative posterior (or estimated) density for a model parameter. The top (blue)
line shows the cumulative density for a, which is the estimated degree of spatial dependence
among adjacent congressional districts. The bottom (maroon) line is the cumulative density
for s, which is the estimated degree of diusion of website practices within state delegations
(holding constant district level heterogeneity). The dashed grey line indicates the cumulative
prior distribution for each of these parameters. The gure shows both how each posterior
diers from the prior, as well as how much the distribution for each parameter diers from
each other.
To understand dierences between cumulative distributions, it is sometimes easier to
rst consider how the densities dier, and then consider how changes in densities changes
the shape of the cumulative distribution function. Figure 6 shows the smoothed posterior
densities for each of the two  parameters, along with the uniform prior density for each.
First consider the prior Uniform [0,1] density, drawn in grey, where the density accumulates
from zero to one in a linear manner. For this density, the cumulative distribution function is
a straight line connecting the origin to the point (1,1), and is indicated with a dashed grey
line in gure 5.
Next consider the posterior density for a. This density has a mode close to zero and is
skewed to the right. This posterior distribution indicates that there is little if any dependence
in this process that result from district adjacency; the spatial correlation at the district level is
approximately zero. In this case, moving from left to right in gure 5, the density accumulates
quickly at rst, and then tapers o, resulting in a cumulative distribution function that hasEsterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 28
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Figure 5: How to interpret the results in gures 2 and 3
a steep slope close to zero and a relatively at slope above about 0.6. Finally consider the
posterior density for s, which has a mode at about 0.8. This indicates that there is stronger
evidence that dependence exists within a state delegation; the probability that the spatial
correlation is above 0.5 is quite high. In this case, moving from left to right in gure 5, the
cumulative distribution function is relatively at at low values for the parameter estimate,
and then is steep starting around 0.5.
In general, a cumulative distribution function that is to the lower-right indicates a high
correlation estimate, that is, a density that is concentrated at the high range of possible
parameter values. A cumulative distribution function that is to the upper-left indicatesEsterling, Lazer & Neblo, Website Diusion in State Delegations 29
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Figure 6: Prior and posterior densities for a and s
a low correlation estimates, or a density that is concentrated at a low range of possible
parameter values. Finally, the farther a cumulative distribution is from the grey dashed line,
the more that has been gleaned about the process from the data; cumulative distributions
that are close to the grey line indicate we have learned nothing beyond the prior beliefs used
to dene the model.
Finally, the cumulative distribution graphs also report the p-value for a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for the equality of the posterior distributions for a and a. A low p-value
indicates that the two distributions are dierent.
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